Richiamo, per chi lo desideri, l'indirizzo delle mie discusse considerazioni pubblicate sul sito della Dire http://www.dire.it/DIRE-EMILIA-ROMAGNA/sondaggio_a.php?c=33265&m=14&l=it
e sviluppo alcuni chiarimenti.
Riassumo la discussione ferragostana sull’apertura al ‘centro’. Non prima di Clarification.
The estimated contribution of the followers of Guazzaloca a center-left had not expanded as the purpose of sawing anything (as he wrote mischievously Courier). He responded to a purely quantitative kind of personal curiosity. As often happens, of all the comments there is one that has focused on the reliability of numbers and their meaning. Apart from the empirical validity of the survey (on which, obviously, put my hand on fire), it is logically reasonable estimate of 3%? I think so. Just look at the trend and develop some evaluation. The
'99. In '99 (first round) was Guazzaloca 104,571 votes (41.5%). The right-wing candidates, all considered (ie Guazzaloca, Ruocco, Pasquini and Poli), touched the 48% approximately. An extraordinary figure, never touched the city. Even considering the falling rate of turnout. The surveys showed that flow at least 5% of voters were passed to Your Ds Bologna. The reason for the debacle that has left much debating: the inadequacy of the candidate, the infighting within the Ds, repeated errors, the division left, the discontent arose during the tenure Vitali etc. Here should be added to the grounds of a general nature usually neglected, but no less important: the fall of consent, the concerns and disappointments in militant and electoral base of the Olive and the DS, as well as the deaf hostilities against the government emerged D'Alema. Without the shock generated by the Serb-Kosovo war, without the concerns generated by the statements on the eve of the vote by D'Alema for pension reform, without the spirit of revenge prodiani cultivated by the fall of Prodi, with the creation of the donkey, the City would hardly changed hands, well considering all the causes of local character. In summary Guazzaloca won as much as was left to win a set of congiuranti will (and converging from the left, center, from the inside) and operating on several levels (local and national). The Bologna's head was in a sense, the price charged to the ambition of the government of D'Alema and the DS.
2004. In 2004 it suffered a heavy defeat by Cofferati. However, his personal performance and coalitional was not negligible. Regained, in substance, the same absolute ratings of the first round '99 (103,281, 40.7%). Despite a partial return of votes left to the right had a good grip, even considering the current climate of political debate to rule against it (the Berlusconi government had entered into an often long shadow). A portion of the votes that were passed from the left in the middle remained hooked to Guazzaloca (besides the fact they had prodiani mostra di grande entusiasmo all’arrivo di Cofferati, come dimostrato dal fatto che subito s’impegnarono, alleandosi con la sinistra radicale, in un’aspra guerriglia ai suoi danni). Cofferati vinse grazie soprattutto alla sua capacità di coalizzare ai Ds l’elettorato di sinistra scontento. Scontentezza, però, che riprese presto il sopravvento.
Il 2009. Anno nel quale si consuma il destino di Guazzaloca come leader di un più vasto arco di forze. Correndo da solo aggrega solo 28.785 voti, pari al 12,7 %. Perde clamorosamente le ‘primarie’ con Cazzola. Al secondo turno almeno il 60 % dei suoi sostenitori si sposta sul candidato della destra, pure in assenza di indicazioni di voto da parte di Guazzaloca. A sinistra il candidato Delbono mostra scarso appeal, tanto è vero che rimane al di sotto del voto della coalizione e deve andare al ballottaggio. Se il ‘centro’ civico implode ed è in maggior parte riassorbito dalla destra, la sinistra si sfrangia di nuovo. Le liste ‘alternative’ (guidate da Favia, Pasquino, Monteventi, Tedde e Terra) toccano nel complesso quasi l’8 % dei voti. Una cifra destinata ad ampliarsi con la performances di grillini alle regionali del 2010.
Riassumiamo quindi lo stato dell’arte. Con il 2009 viene meno, e defintivamente, l’egemonia che le forze moderate guidate da Guazzaloca hanno esercitato per almeno due tornate elettorali sulla destra. Il numerical cleavage between center-right and center-left (treated as blocks) came under the physiological relationship 40/60. However, even after the experience of the commissioner, the electorate has grown 'opaque' potentially abstainer. In most policy fields have been further fragmented. The right does not seem able to find alternatives to moderate civic-drive model. It has no personality and is good to hire internally wounded, even more than by the defection of Finian, of brawls personalistic. On the other hand Guazzaloca, and what remains of his followers, does not have many alternatives that seek a dialogue on the left, resulting in some way, to take awake a minimum of attention to the virtual civic space collapsed with the moderate-'99. The Democratic Party, by contrast, is seen threatened by the rise of a new 'civic radical', hostile parties (anti-cartel), is intended to redefine the ancient depths of the civic space 'moderate'. Perhaps greater danger (and certainly more realistic) for a possible re-welding to the right side of the 'third', 'civic' or 'moderate'.
In this context, the estimate of 3% (between 6,000 and 9,000 votes, according to the level of abstentions) Guazzaloca attributed to as' added value of an alliance 'center' is not only realistic, but optimistic, perhaps in excess. Few? There are so many? It depends on how you look at things. They all somehow their reasons. And those that highlight thus defined as a purchase could be paid on the 'left' irreducible, with a further enlargement of the 'civic radical' hostile to the Democratic Party. Both for those who appreciate the political and symbolic significance and investment which, however, emphasize that Sl and Rc are not worth (together) more than 3%. The rest I find myself out of the arrogance with which some measure of gauche members have derided the fateful 3 (%).
For myself I understand the concern the leaders of the Democratic Party. Trying to broaden the range of forces that do not recognize themselves in the right. Avoid isolation and a convergence of hostile designs. Quite legitimately Campagnoli has anchored his candidacy in this perspective. Like other other visions (Pasquino wrote about things shared in the Corriere ...). It 'true, however, that the search for alliances may not have happened if consumed in the name of an engagement neurotic betrays insecurity, or a headlong quest for primacy. How to Bologna, after all that has happened, must necessarily act as a hare in a political project that has elsewhere (center and state in the south) its test bench. So you could just sbarellare, creating uncertainty and raising the price in favor of the forces 'marginal'. Guazzaloca fact has been raised a preliminary 'anti-Cevenini' that should have been declared inadmissible from the outset. Not to mention this idea of \u200b\u200b'better government' is a sign that, at least, a huge, however paradoxical, self-esteem. About lidecide the 'best'? Guazzaloca? And out of them who they are: the 'worst'? The evil against the good? The demons against the angels? A Manichaean madness, worthy of a sect of Zoroastrians. With all the repercussions of the case. Not for nothing, left, the opening has been mobilized to Guazzaloca the claims of the other 3%. The
Pd should rather equip the best of his proposal, ideas and people, first gaining the trust of its constituency (which, again according to the numbers, it does not justify any transferor to panic). Dictating the agenda to have it without instruction from the first that shows up. Even for what concerns the radical civic space-the best way to contain the diplomacy does not seem to dialogue (not as good manners do not hurt), because the security of the foundations on which the Democratic Party intends to move.
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